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Abstract—The future of Internet of Things (IoT) is already 
upon us. IoT applications have been widely used in many field of 
social production and social living such as healthcare, energy and 
industrial automation. While enjoying the convenience and 
efficiency that IoT brings to us, new threats from IoT also have 
emerged. There are increasing research works to ease these 
threats, but many problems remain open. To better understand 
the essential reasons of new threats and the challenges in current 
research, this survey first proposes the concept of “IoT features”. 
Then, the security and privacy effects of eight IoT new features 
were discussed including the threats they cause, existing solutions 
and challenges yet to be solved. To help researchers follow the 
up-to-date works in this field, this paper finally illustrates the 
developing trend of IoT security research and reveals how IoT 
features affect existing security research by investigating most 
existing research works related to IoT security from 2013 to 2017.  
 
Index Terms—Internet-of-Things (IoT), IoT features, privacy, 
security, survey. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith the development of critical technologies in the 
Internet of things (IoT), the IoT applications (e.g., smart 
home, digital healthcare, smart grid, smart city) become widely 
used in the world. According to statistics website Statista [1], 
the number of connected devices around the world will 
dramatically increase from 20.35 billion in 2017 to 75.44 
billion in 2025. International Data Corporation (IDC) [2] has 
predicted a 17.0% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in 
IoT spending from $698.6 billion in 2015 to nearly $1.3 trillion 
in 2019, there seems to be a consensus that the impact of IoT 
technologies is substantial and growing. 
Along with the rapid growth of IoT application and devices, 
cyber-attacks will also be improved and pose a more serious 
threat to security and privacy than ever before. For instance, 
remote adversaries could compromise patients’ Implantable 
medical devices [3] or smart cars [4], which may not only cause 
huge economic losses to individuals but also threat peoples’ 
lives. Furthermore, as the IoT devices become widely used in 
industry, military, and other key areas, hackers can jeopardize 
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public and national security. For example, on 21 October 2016, 
a multiple distributed denial of service (DDoS) [5] attacks 
systems operated by Domain Name System provider Dyn, 
which caused the inaccessibility of several websites such as 
GitHub, Twitter, and others. This attack just executed through a 
botnet consisting of a large number of IoT devices including 
printers, IP cameras, gateways and baby monitors etc. In 
another instance, Stuxnet [6] a malicious computer worm 
targets industrial computer systems were responsible for 
causing substantial damage to Iran's nuclear program. 
However, most of the enterprises and individuals lack 
awareness of privacy and security. A recent study by Pew 
Research Center [7] found that many Americans feel 
over-optimistic about how their data have been used. Only 26% 
Americans do not accept their health information to be shared 
with their doctor. Moreover, nearly half of Americans agreed 
that it was acceptable auto insurance companies to monitor 
their location and driving speed in order to offer discounts on 
their insurance. On the other hand, due the lack of customer 
demand, manufacturers used to focus on implementing 
products’ core functions while ignoring security. Meanwhile, 
IoT devices vendors generally do not send updates and patches 
to their devices unless user-initiated firmware updates. At the 
same time, IoT devices typically do not run full-fledged 
security mechanisms due to constrained consumption and 
resource. As a result, IoT devices often remain easy-to-use 
vulnerabilities (e.g., default passwords, unpatched bugs) for 
extended periods [8]. 
Motivated by an increasing number of vulnerabilities, 
attacks and information leaks, IoT device manufactures, cloud 
providers, and researchers are working to design systems to 
security control the flow of information between devices, to 
detect new vulnerabilities, and to provide security and privacy 
within the context of users and the devices. While researchers 
continue to tackle IoT security and privacy, the most studies are 
only in its incipient stages and lack applicability, and many 
problems remain open. In order to point out valuable directions 
for further research and provide useful references for 
researchers, there are many published survey on IoT security. 
Li et al. [9] and Lin et al. [10] mainly discussed and analyzed 
current attacks and challenges following layers. Fu et al. [11] 
highlight some opportunities and potential threats in two 
different application scenarios-home and hospital. Roman et al. 
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[12] and Sicari et al. [13] presented research challenges and the 
promising solutions focusing on different features and security 
mechanism including authentication, access control, 
confidentiality, privacy. The latest survey published by Yang et 
al. [14] synthesis main point of previous surveys and present 
the classification of IoT attacks. They all presented most 
aspects of IoT security research, threats, and open issues, and 
suggest some hints for future research. However, few of them 
exposed and deeply analyzed the root cause of these challenges 
and threats, and clearly identify what new challenges coming 
from IoT. Although Yang et al. and Trappe et al. [15] discussed 
some relevant limitations of IoT devices, they just focus on the 
challenges caused by restricted battery capacity and computing 
power. There are many more IoT constraints and features have 
not been covered could affect the security and privacy. 
To fill the gap, this paper discusses and analyzes the IoT 
security issues from a new perspective - IoT features. “IoT 
features” refers to the unique features of IoT devices network 
and applications, which are different with traditional Internet 
and computers. For example, IoT devices have much less 
computing ability, storage resources, and power supply, thus 
“Constrained” is seen as an IoT feature. The contribution of this 
paper can be summarized as follows: 
a). To find out the basic cause of current IoT threats and 
main challenges in IoT research, we first time propose 
the concept of “IoT features”. 
b). To better understand the effect of IoT features, we 
describe eight features which have most impact on 
security and privacy issues and discuss the threats, 
research challenges, and opportunities derived from 
each feature.  
c). We present the development trends of current IoT 
security and its cause based on IoT features though the 
analysis of existing research in recent five years.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section Ⅱ is the 
main parts of this paper, we focus on eight IoT features as 
shown in Fig. 1, and fully discuss and analyze them 
respectively. Then we collect nearly 200 research related to IoT 
security from 2013 to 2017 and provide many kinds of 
statistical analysis with them in Section Ⅲ. Finally, conclusions 
are presented in Section Ⅳ. 
II. THE EFFECT OF IOT FEATURES ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
In this section, we will elaborate four aspects about each IoT 
features in Fig 1: description, threat, challenges, solutions, and 
opportunities. 
1). Description: We introduce what the feature is and what 
the differences between traditional devices, network, and 
applications are. 
2). Threat: We discuss what potential threats and 
vulnerabilities brought by the feature, and the 
consequences caused by these threats. We also provide 
diagrams and attack examples for some threats, which 
makes it easy to follow. 
3). Challenges: We present what research challenges caused 
by the features.  
4). Solutions & Opportunities: We present existing solutions 
to tackle the challenges and the drawbacks of these 
solutions. In addition, we also introduce some new 
security techniques/ideas that could also help to migrate 
the challenges and threats as opportunities here.  
A. Interdependence 
1) Description: As the number of IoT devices increases, the 
interaction between devices become more complex and need 
less human involvement. IoT devices are no longer just 
communicate explicitly with each other like traditional 
computers or smartphones. Many of them could also implicitly 
controlled by other multiple devices behaviors or 
environmental conditions using services like IFTTT (if this 
then that) [16], which is popular in various IoT application 
scenarios. For example, if the thermometer detects the indoor 
temperature has been raised and the threshold and smart plug 
detect the air conditioner was in the "off" state, and then the 
windows would automatically open. The similar examples are 
more common in industrial and agricultural devices (e.g., 
automatic adding more water into smelters according to 
temperature and humidity). We call this implicitly dependence 
relationship between devices as an IoT feature named 
“Interdependence” here. 
2) Threats: The target device or system itself might not be 
easily compromised, but the attackers could easily change other 
devices behavior or the surrounding environment, which have 
interdependence relationship to achieve their aims. As a result, 
this feature could be maliciously used to reduce the difficulty of 
direct attack the target devices and bypass original defense 
mechanism. For example, back to the scenario described as the 
first example in the last paragraph, the hackers do not need to 
attack the automatic window control or thermometer. However, 
he could compromise the smart plug that connected to the 
public network to turn off the air-conditioner in a room and 
trigger a temperature increase, which would result in the 
windows to open and create a physical security breach, as 
shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 1.  IoT Features. 
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3) Challenges: The majority of the researchers do not realize 
the effect of interdependence behaviors on IoT security. 
Researchers generally protect the single device itself. However, 
it is difficult to make a clear defensive boundary of IoT devices 
or use static access control methods and privilege management 
to them because of their interdependent behaviors. In addition, 
the management of most of IoT devices controlled by cloud 
platforms applications (e.g., Samsung SmartThings [17], Apple 
HomeKit [18], Amazon Alexa [19], JD [23], and Ali [24]), 
which have already gained great popularity among smart home 
users today. Due the IoT device behaviors could be changed 
with other devices or environmental conditions, it is difficult to 
define a certain set of fine-grained permission rules for them. 
The overprivilege has become a common problem in the 
permission model of existing IoT platforms applications [20]. 
4) Solutions & Opportunities: The team at Carnegie Mellon 
University was aware of the cross-device dependencies early, 
and proposed a set of new security policies for detecting 
anomaly behavior of interdependence [21]. However, these 
policies will be more complicated and impractical with the 
increasing number of devices. Last year, Yunhan et al. [22] 
proposed ContexIoT, a new context-based permission system 
for IoT platforms application to solve overprivileged problem. 
It records and compares more context information such as 
procedure control and data flow, and runtime data of every IoT 
device action before it is executed, and then let the user allow or 
deny this action based on this information. This method could 
detect the misuse of IoT devices interdependence behaviors as 
early. Because even if hackers make the misbehavior at the 
same physical conditions with the normal, it is hard to create 
the same context information like data sources. However, this 
method still too dependent on user decision, so once user makes 
a wrong decision, the system will remember this wrong 
decision and will not prompts the user again. While more 
effective and practical solutions are urgently needed to address 
the threats posed by the interdependence. 
B. Diversity 
1) Description: On the one hand, as IoT technology widely 
used in more application scenarios. More kinds of IoT devices 
are designed for specific tasks and interact strongly with the 
physical environment. Thus, their hardware, system, and 
process requirements are unique. For example, a small 
temperature sensor might run on a single chip MCS-51 with a 
few KB flash and RAM, while a complex machine tool might 
have higher performance than our smartphone. On the other 
hand, in different application scenarios also need different 
network and communication protocols. To seize the IoT market, 
many large IT companies launched their cloud platform to 
manage IoT devices as we mentioned above, and each of them 
designs their own wireless access, authentication and 
communication protocols. We call the many different kinds of 
IoT devices and protocols as an IoT feature named “diversity” 
here 
2) Threats: Due to increasing kinds of new IoT devices 
began flooding the IoT market with fewer safety checks, Ali 
mobile security team [25] found more than 90% of IoT device 
firmware has security vulnerabilities like hard-coded key, and 
94% known Web security vulnerabilities still existed in these 
devices' Web interfaces, which could easily be used by hackers. 
In order to roll out IoT cloud platform quickly and lacking 
the experience for new IoT application demand such as IoT 
device bootstrapping [26], the protocols designed by IT 
companies may have many potential security problems. For 
instance, Liu et al. [27] found the attack could carry out several 
attacks with JoyLink protocol of JD, such as device hijacking 
shown in Fig. 3. Moreover, different protocols have different 
semantic definitions, the attackers also could use this point to 
find security vulnerabilities like BadTunnel [28] when they 
uncorrected work together. 
3) Challenges: For system security, due to the diversity of 
IoT devices, it is hard to design a common system defense for 
the heterogeneous devices, especially in industry area [29]. 
Thus, how to discover and deal with so many security 
vulnerabilities among the various IoT devices needs to be 
addressed urgently. 
For network security, due every protocol has differences 
with others, so it is important for researchers to dig out general 
crucial security problems of them. Besides, the security 
problems for the protocol and network themselves, researchers 
should also consider the potential security issues caused by 
association with different protocols. 
4) Solutions & Opportunities: To discover and address the 
potential vulnerabilities for more kinds of IoT devices, 
researchers attempted to use static or dynamic analysis [30] of 
the firmware and source running on these devices. In 2014, 
Zaddach et al. [31] put forward a framework to support 
dynamic security analysis for a variety of embedded systems’ 
firmware. It cannot simulate all action of the real devices and 
need to forward action from the emulator to the device. Thus, it 
is unsuitable for large-scale firmware analysis without physical 
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connecting devices. Chen et al. [32] presented a framework for 
large-scale automated firmware dynamic analysis, but it is only 
applicable to the Linux-based system. The full firmware 
dynamic analysis simulation framework for Real-Time 
Operating System (RTOS) and bare-metal system is nearly 
blank.  
On the other hand, researchers rely on the Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS) 
to protect many kinds of devices at same time. However, the 
different attacks vary according to their target devices, thus 
some researchers pointed out the IDS and IPS systems model 
based on anomaly traffic detection may not work well to the 
different kinds of devices. They suggested that the IDS and IPS 
systems should first detect abnormal the parameter which could 
affect the devices’ behaviors among network traffic. For 
example, Hadziosmanovic et al. [33] attempted to model 
process variable in the traffic and determined whether the 
parameter beyond their appropriate ranges using machine 
learning techniques to detect potential attacks. Sullivan et al. 
[34] added that the appropriate ranges of industrial IoT devices 
should not only depends on analysis of the traffic, but also need 
to be revised by the professional and experienced operators. 
The more suitable learning model for the IDS and IPS system 
based on the heterogeneous IoT devices still need further study. 
C. Constrained 
1) Description: Because of cost and actual physical 
conditions, many IoT devices like industrial sensor and 
implantable medical devices have been designed to be 
lightweight and in small size. Thus, they have much less 
computing ability and storage resources than traditional 
computers and mobile phone. In addition, many IoT devices 
military, industrial, agricultural devices have to work for a long 
time in environments where charging is not available, so they 
also have stringent requirements for power consumption. On 
the other hand, many IoT devices used in vehicle systems, robot 
control systems and real-time healthcare systems also have to 
meet the deadline constraints of the real-time processes. We 
describe the limit resource, power supply and latency of IoT 
devices as an IoT feature named “constrained” here. 
2) Threats: Constrained by resource, power supply, and time 
delay, most IoT devices do not deploy necessary defenses for 
system and network. For example, lightweight IoT devices do 
not have the memory management unit (MMU), so memory 
isolation, address space layout randomization (ASLR) and 
other memory safety measures cannot be directly deployed on 
these devices. Moreover, much complicated encryption and 
authentication algorithms like public cryptography implement 
on such devices, they occupy too much computing resource and 
causes a long delay, which affects the normal operation of these 
devices and reduces performance especially for real-time IoT 
devices. Consequently, it is easy for attackers to use memory 
vulnerabilities to compromise these devices. At the same time, 
due to limit resource many IoT devices even communicate with 
the server without encryption or use SSL encryption without 
checking the server's certificate. Attackers could easily 
intercept communication or launch man-in-the-middle attacks. 
3) Challenges: How to achieve fine-grain system protections 
with less system software and hardware resource on 
lightweight IoT devices is a great challenge for researchers. In 
addition, such system protections also need to be satisfied the 
time and power constraints in practical application condition. 
On the other hand, it is also difficult for researchers to deploy 
much complex encryption and authentication algorithms with 
less latency and computing resource on tiny IoT devices. 
4) Solutions & Opportunities: There are increasing studies 
focus on designing system security mechanisms for lightweight 
devices, but most of them still cannot both satisfy the security 
and application requirements. ARMor, [35] a lightweight 
software fault isolation can be used to sandbox application code 
running on small embedded processors., but it caused the 
high-performance overhead for those programs which need 
checking address many times (e.g. string search). It is not 
applicable for high real-time demand IoT devices. Koeberl et al. 
[36] presented a set of relatively complete trusted computing 
functions for lightweight devices such as attestation and trusted 
execution. However, its implementation has to change the 
existing hardware architecture of MCU, so it cannot be directly 
applied to existing IoT devices. Other system defenses like 
EPOXY [37] and MINION [38] have been proposed recently 
better address above challenges, but these protections work 
base on static analysis of firmware or source code, which will 
increase the burden on developers. 
To protect network security for tiny IoT devices, most 
cryptology researchers reduce resource consumption by 
designing new lightweight algorithms [39-41] or optimize the 
original cryptography algorithms [42]. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult for lightweight algorithms to achieve the same security 
level with classical algorithms and new cryptography 
algorithms may have potential security problems. Some 
researchers attempt new solutions to address this challenge. For 
example, Majzoobi team and Hiller team proposed the 
authentication [43] and key generation algorithm both based on 
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) [44], which use the 
unique physical structure of the device to identify itself. This 
method not only saves key resources storage and simplify the 
algorithm, but also can effectively resist the side channel 
analysis. Other researchers also tried to use users’ unique 
biological characteristics like gait [45] and usage habits [46] 
collected by some wearable IoT devices to improve 
authentication algorithms. It can save resource and authenticate 
both user and device at same time. However biometric or 
physical characteristic does not always follow the same pattern. 
Some unpredictable factors may change them slightly. The 
stability and the accuracy of these new methods need yet to be 
further improved. 
D. Myriad 
1) Description: Due to the rapidly proliferating IoT devices, 
the amount of data these devices generated, transited, used will 
reach be mounting to astronomical figures. We describe the 
enormous number of IoT devices and the huge amount of IoT 
data as an IoT feature named “Myriad” here. 
2) Threats: Last year’s Mirai botnet compromised more than 
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1 million IoT devices, and the attack traffic had exceeded 
1Tbps, which previous cyber attacks have never been achieved. 
Furthermore, more and more new IoT botnet like IoTroop [47]. 
The IoT Botnet was made mostly of unsecured IoT devices 
rather than computers, and their speed is much faster and would 
launch large-scale distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. 
Yin et al. design honeypot and sandbox system to collect attack 
samples from IoT devices, and found the most remote network 
attack use IoT devices launch large scale DDoS attacks [48]. As 
more IoT applications used in industrial and public 
infrastructures, the target of IoT botnets would no longer just be 
the website, but also the important infrastructures, which would 
bring grave damages to the social security. 
3) Challenges: Most of IoT devices lack system defense and 
do not have any safety test software as anti-virus could detect 
malicious programs. Furthermore, as we discussed before, IoT 
devices are diversity and very limited in the power supply and 
computing resource. Thus, how to detect and prevent IoT 
botnet virus in IoT devices early is great challenge for 
researchers. At the same time, how to interrupt transmission of 
huge amount of IoT devices is also a tough problem. 
4) Solutions & Opportunities: As the increasingly DDoS 
attack by IoT botnets, many researchers tried to mitigate IoT 
botnets related cyber risks by using the source code for the 
Mirai. For instance, JA Jerkins et al. [49] designed a tactic that 
could use the same compromise vector as the Mirai botnet to 
catalog vulnerable IoT devices, and detect potential poor 
security practices early. While there still no effective and 
universal precautions for botnet virus. Zhang and Green [50] 
first consider the device and environment constraints of IoT 
network, then design a lightweight algorithm to distinguish 
malicious requests from legitimate ones in an IoT network, but 
their assumption was too simple, hackers would not send 
requests with the same content, but usually simulate users’ 
request with different reasonable content. Moreover, the 
current DDoS intrusion detection methods only apply in certain 
scenarios like smart grid [51] or an IoT network based on the 
single protocol like 6LoWPAN [52]. 
E. Unattended 
1) Description: Smart meters, implantable medical devices 
(IMDs) and many industrial, agricultural and military sensors 
in the special physical environment have to perform functions 
and operate for a long period of time without physical access. 
As increasing adoption of wireless networking prompts, these 
devices are evolving into IoT devices. We describe this 
long-time unattended status of IoT devices as an IoT feature 
named “unattended” here. 
2) Threats: In such settings, it is hard to physically connect 
an external interface to verify the state of these devices. Thus, it 
is hard to detect when these devices have been remote attacked. 
In addition, because these devices like IMDs and industrial 
control devices usually carry out crucial operations, hackers 
more likely to regard them as prime targets. For example, 
Stuxnet worm could infect the Programmable Logic 
Controllers (PLC) used in industrial control systems, which 
result in considerable physical damage. 
3) Challenges: As we mentioned above, these “unattended” 
devices are also made mostly of “constrained” devices. 
Moreover, they are also usually designed to perform highly 
specific tasks and interact strongly with the physical 
environment. Their hardware, system, and process 
requirements are specific, and it is hard to deploy traditional 
mobile trusted computing for them [53]. For instance, process 
memory isolation based on virtual memory is no longer feasible, 
because many tiny IoT devices are built on hardware that does 
not provide a memory management unit (MMU). Thus, 
building trusted execution environment (TEE) to ensure 
security-critical operations be correctly executed under remote 
exploits and verifying internal state of a remote unattended tiny 
IoT device become important tasks in many scenarios. 
4) Solutions & Opportunities: TrustShadow [75] aims to 
ensure trusted execution environments for security-critical 
applications within the context of IoT devices using ARM 
TrustZone technology. However, such technology is based on 
the ARM cortex-A processor and does not support tiny IoT 
devices based on lightweight processor, such as ARM cortex-M. 
SMART, [54] a remote attestation method combing software 
and hardware to overcome the disadvantages of the only system 
protection by software or hardware. However, some access 
control logic of SMART like the update of attestation code and 
interaction between multiple protected modules involve too 
much delay. Noorman et al. [55] built a lightweight trusted 
execution environment for small embedded, but this method 
didn’t consider how to safely handle the hardware interrupt and 
memory exception. More effective and widely applicable 
remote attestation, lightweight trusted execution and safety 
patch solutions remain open problems. 
F. Intimacy 
1) Description: As smart meters, wearable devices and even 
some smart sex toys [56] become more widely used in our lives. 
These devices not only collect much our biology information 
including heart rate and blood pressure but also monitor and 
record our surrounding information and daily activities like the 
change of indoor temperature and the places you have been. We 
describe this intimate relationship between users and IoT 
devices as an IoT feature named “Intimacy” here. 
2) Threats: The intimate relationships between users and IoT 
devices will certainly raising more serious and unnoticed 
privacy concerns. Some researchers [57] show that attackers 
can infer whether the home is occupied with more than 90 
percent accuracy just by analyzing smoke and carbon dioxide 
sensors data. The power consumption recorded by the smart 
plug could also be used to analyze your operations on the 
computers [58]. As cloud-based service will be offered more 
and more IoT implementations, according to the Gartner 
Statistics [59]. These sensitive data collected by IoT devices 
will be shared with service providers. Driven by profit, service 
providers also keep these data forever and even shared these 
data with other advertising agency without the user's consent, 
which can increase the risk of privacy leak. Hackers could 
obtain the IoT device sensitive data by more sources or acquires 
illegal benefits by modifying theses data [74]. 
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3) Challenges: On the one hand, IoT applications rely on 
users’ personal information to provide service (e.g., auto 
insurance company collect driving data of each user to offer 
customized discounts [60]). On the other hand, collecting, 
transferring and using these sensitive information increases the 
attack surface of privacy leak. Thus, how to offers an attractive 
trade-off between sensitive information utility and privacy is a 
great challenge for the academic community.  
4) Solutions & Opportunities: Recently, there are increasing 
studies focusing on the privacy protection of IoT data and 
anonymous protocols. Many solutions use the data masking and 
encryption like homomorphic algorithm to protect sensitive 
information, but these solutions reduce the availability of 
original data and increase the time delay. Effective privacy 
protection method should protect users’ privacy, remain high 
availability of original data and guarantee real-time at the same 
time. Another major problem of current privacy protection 
method is narrow application scope and incomprehensive 
protection. Most solutions only applied to a certain application 
scenarios, (e.g., smart grid [61], smart medical [62] or car 
networking [63]), or to the specific process of data lifecycle 
(e.g., data collection [64], privacy data sharing with the cloud 
service [65]). More complete and general protection needs 
more in-depth research, including data collection, transmission, 
use, storage, and sharing. 
Conversely, due biological characteristics are different from 
person to person, the intimate relationships between users and 
IoT devices could also be contributed to cryptography. As we 
discussed above researchers could use these biological signals 
collected by devices to generate a unique encryption key for 
users or to provide authentication [66]. 
G. Mobile 
1) Description: Many IoT devices as wearable devices and 
smart cars are used in the mobile environment. These mobile 
devices often need to hop from one network environment to 
another environment and have to communicate with many 
unknown new devices. For example, use drive smart car from 
one district to another, the car will automatically collect road 
information for highway foundational facilities in the new 
district. This scenario will be more common in the future of 
social IoT. We describe the movement of IoT devices as an IoT 
feature named “mobile” here. 
2) Threats: Because mobile IoT devices are more likely to 
join more networks, hackers tend to inject the malicious code 
into mobile IoT devices to accelerate the spread of malicious 
code. At the same time, because mobile devices need to 
communicate with more devices, the attack surface of mobile 
themselves will be border. The coming crisis tend to be worse 
in social IoT devices. In future, the social IoT devices would 
carry more sensitive information and automatically follow the 
user’s joining from one social network into another. 
3) Challenges: In response to the threat, the main security 
challenge should be addressed is cross-domain identification 
and trust. For example, when a mobile device hops from one 
domain to another and how the new domain to verify this 
device and what kind of permissions should give to it. When 
data carried with mobile devices passed from one network or 
protocol to another, it also involves key negotiation, data 
confidentiality, integrity protection and other important 
security issues. 
4) Solutions & Opportunities: Chen et al. [67] try to decrease 
the probability of being attacked by dynamically changing the 
configuration of devices according to the trust condition of 
other devices in different networks. This method would not 
address the root of the problem. There are few suitable access 
control policies for the mobile devices have been proposed. 
More thorough studies should be done to solve these problems 
in this area. 
H. Ubiquitous 
1) Description: The IoT devices have pervaded every aspect 
of our lives. We will not just use them, but also rely on them 
and even be more dependent than the smartphone. IoT will 
become an indispensable part of people's daily lives like air and 
water. We describe the phenomena that IoT devices will be 
everywhere in our future lives as an IoT feature named 
“Ubiquitous”. In this section, we do not focus on this feature 
effect on security in the technology as above. We will discuss 
the lack of security and privacy awareness of the “ubiquitous” 
IoT devices and its resulting threat. We will also give some 
suggestions should adopt towards the “ubiquitous” IoT devices. 
In addition, we will discuss above issues from the following 
four distinct social roles: ordinary consumers, manufacturers, 
professional operators, and security researchers. 
2) Threats & Suggestions 
a) Consumers: As the IoT device is taking off in emerging 
markets, the number of devices will surpass the number of 
humans. According to the statistics from Govtech [68], 
everyone will own an average of six to eight IoT devices by 
2020. That is just the number of the devices everyone owns, and 
the number of the actual devices everyone use will be more. 
However, most people still lack the management awareness and 
privacy protection awareness. As IoT devices more intelligent 
and closer to our lives, they could automatically complete many 
assignments without any manual intervention and even any 
reminders. Thus, many users do not realize their devices have 
been compromised until attackers lead to more obvious and 
serious consequences. People always ignore the safety and 
reliability of IoT devices when buying and using IoT products. 
Therefore, malware like Mirai virus can just use default 
username and password to perform remote control so many IoT 
devices. In 2014, WeLiveSecurity team highlighted the 
discovery of 73,000 security cameras with default passwords 
[69]. Consumers should change their consciousness from a user 
to an administrator and pay attention to IoT security as the same 
way to food safety. Only in this way could we fundamentally 
avoid "human" becoming the weakest link in the IoT security. 
b) Manufacturers: The IoT device manufacturers also do 
not attach enough importance to the security of IoT products. A 
large proportion of manufacturers consider security measures 
will add additional cost without any profits. Thus, company 
keeps producing and deploying new IoT devices with 
insecure-by-default configuration. These devices not only have 
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many known vulnerabilities, but also have the potential flaw in 
their design. For example, the In-Vehicle infotainment systems 
or vehicle navigation systems in many smart cars directly 
connect to CAN-Bus. Attackers could compromise these 
systems, and then use the CAN-Bus to control the car [70], as 
shown in Fig. 4. 
On the other hand, enterprises usually do not supply any 
security service for customers. For example, manufacturers 
always only write simple instructions in their manual without 
any security suggestions and notices. Customer usually could 
not know what sensitive information the devices will collect, 
and how to more safely use them. Manufacturers also do not 
take the initiative to help customers install patches or update 
firmware against new malware threats and even do not send any 
security warnings. Therefore, IoT devices vulnerabilities have 
longer exploited period and broader impact than traditional 
computer vulnerabilities. It is the urgent needs of setting the 
detailed security standards for IoT products. IoT manufactures 
also should work tightly with the supervisory agencies, as DHS 
and FSA. 
c) Operators: With the IoT devices are widely used in 
industry, agriculture and even military fields, the security 
awareness of profession operators also needs to be raised. Most 
operators consider [71] attackers may do not know how to use 
these specialist devices, let alone attack them. Thus, when these 
devices have abnormal behaviors, most operators’ first 
response is the malfunction of the equipment or the failure of 
their own operations. However, attacking a well-targeted 
device is much easier than using all devices correctly, thus 
operators should increase the sensitivity of abnormal behaviors 
and must be skilled in using security tools like IDS and IPS. 
d) Researchers: As IoT devices are applied to more 
scenarios, there will be more types and functions of devices 
with different resources and architectures, as we mentioned 
above. Researchers should no longer only focus on theory study, 
and need more cooperation with consumers, manufacturers and 
professional operators. Then researchers could have more 
comprehensive insight into the actual usage of IoT devices in 
the real conditions and design more practical safety precautions 
with fewer resource demand and lower extra cost. 
I. Summary 
The features we discussed above are not independent but 
interact with each other. For instance, the resource of most 
unattended devices is constrained. When designing security 
solutions for these devices, researchers need to take the effect 
of both features into consideration. In addition, other IoT 
features that have less impact on security and privacy are out of 
the scope. Also, some IoT features such as extensibility and 
integration may bring certain security and privacy issues, but 
most of these issues have much overlap with the features we 
have discussed above. We finally summarized the main threats, 
challenges, and opportunities of each feature in Table Ⅰ. 
III.  IOT SECURITY RESEARCH ANALYSIS  
In order to grasp the latest trend of development of IoT 
security research and better understand how above IoT features 
affect existing security research, we studied nearly 200 research 
papers related to IoT security from top journals and conferences 
in recent five years. We will illustrate the development of IoT 
security research base on these research and reveal the reasons 
behind it. We also give some suggestions to researchers based 
on the analysis and help them to keep up with the latest IoT 
security research status and research priorities for further study. 
A. Research Collection and Label 
To help with understanding the statistical analysis and 
classification of IoT research papers in the remainder of this 
section. We first explain how we searched and filtered existing 
research papers either in or out of our study scope, and 
introduce how we labeled each paper in this section. 
Firstly, we collected the research paper from leading journals 
and conferences in computer security (concrete catalog see the 
GitHub link in Appendix). Then we determined whether the 
research is related IoT security by following procedure. Firstly, 
we chose some words directly related to IoT as IoT keywords 
including all kinds IoT devices, protocols and application 
scenarios (e.g., smart watch, smart home, WSN). Then if the 
title of paper contains these IoT keywords or its abbreviation, 
we added it to our study list. Otherwise, we checked whether 
the abstract of this paper includes the word “privacy” or 
“security”, and IoT keywords at the same time. Finally, there 
TABLE I 
THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES OF EACH IOT FEATURES 
Feature Threat Challenge Opportunity 
Inter- 
dependence 
Bypassing 
static defenses, 
Overprivilege  
Access control 
and privilege 
management 
Context-based 
permission 
Diversity Insecure 
protocols 
Fragmented Dynamic 
analysis 
simulation 
platform, IDS 
Constrained Insecure 
systems 
Lightweight 
defenses and 
protocols 
Combining 
biological and 
physical 
characteristics  
Myriad IoT botnet, 
DDoS 
Intrusion 
detection and 
prevention 
IDS 
Unattended Remote attack Remote 
verification 
Remote 
attestation, 
Lightweight 
trusted 
execution 
Intimacy Privacy leak Privacy 
protection 
Homomorphic 
encryption, 
Anonymous 
protocols 
Mobile Malware 
propagation 
Cross-domain 
identification 
and trust 
Dynamic 
configuration 
Ubiquitous Insecure 
configuration 
\ Safety 
consciousness 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Attack Example of Insecure Configuration. 
Smart Car
①Compromise In-Vehicle 
Infotainment
②Using CAN command to 
control the car
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were nearly 200 research papers selected for further study (all 
tags of these papers see the GitHub link in Appendix). 
In addition, in order to classify these papers according to SOA 
IoT layers (e.g., sensing, transfer, service, and interface) [72] or 
application scenarios for the further statistical analysis and to 
find what problem research care most at present stage, we 
labeled three tags (layers, application scenarios and threat) with 
every paper. It is easy to determine which layer and application 
the paper belong to base on its topic. Although the solutions of 
these papers are different from each other, what problems of 
some solutions try to solve are close. Thus, we label which 
“threat” tag of each paper base on these common problems. To 
better generalize common problems, we describe these 
problems mainly base on OWASP IoT Top Ten [73] security 
issues (e.g., privacy concern and vulnerable cloud service).  
B. Statistical Analysis 
The Fig. 5 illustrates the change of the proportion of the 
number of papers in some application scenarios in recent years. 
We can find the IoT security research hotspot always follows 
the development of IoT applications. For example, in the early 
2010s, smart grid and smart manufacturing got more 
popularization and application, thus the security research in 
these fields are more than others. However, with the rapid 
development of smart home and healthcare technology over the 
last three years, security researchers turned more attention to 
these field, at the same time, the research interests in the smart 
grid and smart manufacturing was on the decline.  
SUGGESTION: Security researchers should pay attention 
to the new IoT applications, to prevent the potential threats 
before they emerge. 
The Fig. 6 shows the number of research papers in each layer 
of every IoT application scenario. As can be seen from the 
figure security studies distribution of different layers varied 
from one application scenario to another. For instance, there are 
more research of transfer layers in smart manufacturing than in 
application layer, but it is opposite in smart home. That is 
because in industrial and agriculture environment, all sensors 
depend on wireless sensor network (WSN) to communicate 
with each other and remote control system. The security 
problems in WSN will be more dangerous to others. By contrast, 
smart home devices are controlled by mobile applications or 
web applications. Thus, more researchers drew more attention 
to application security in smart home, and transfer security in 
smart manufacturing. Fig. 7 also reinforces this view. 
SUGGESTION: IoT devices in different IoT application 
scenarios have different working models. Researchers 
should understand the differences between different 
application scenarios to grasp their main security problems. 
We counted the number of research papers of each “threat” 
tag in every application scenario, as shown in Fig. 7. Most of 
the research efforts have been focused on migrating privacy 
disclosure and insecure network or protocol problems. That is 
just due to the “intimacy”, “myriad”, and “diversity” features 
which we have discussed above. More sensitive information 
has been collected, transferred and used by IoT devices 
especially smart home and healthcare devices, which must 
involve more privacy issues. Due to a large number of IoT 
devices, attackers more easily to carry out cyber attacks. Most 
new kinds of devices and protocols also have many 
vulnerabilities which catching more efforts to solve these 
problems. The main reason for casing insufficient security 
configures and vulnerable cloud and web service is the lack of 
awareness as we mentioned above. In addition, although 
research on IoT system and IoT mobile application are less in 
the past years, more attackers will find and use the potential 
system and application vulnerabilities caused by the 
“constrained” and “interdependence” IoT features. More 
studies should work in these fields. 
 
Fig. 5.  The proportion of the Number of Papers in Different Application 
Scenarios per Year 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
before 2014 2014 2015 2016 2017
Smart Home Smart Hearlthcare
Smart Grid and Manufacturing Intelligent Vehicles
 
Fig. 7.  The Number of Papers of Different Threat Tags in Different 
Application Scenarios 
 
Fig. 6. The Number of Papers of Each Layer in Different IoT Application 
Scenarios 
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SUGGESTION: Researchers need to investigate further to 
discover the root causes and new IoT features behind new 
security threats, and design more generic and practical 
protective measures. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyzed and discussed the security and 
privacy issues base on IoT features. We first presented what the 
threats and research challenges born from these features. Then 
we also studied existing solutions for these challenges and 
pointed out what new security technology required further. 
Finally, we illustrated the development trend of recent IoT 
security research, the reason for it, and how IoT features reflect 
on the existing research. Only by deeply analyzing these new 
features behind the Internet of things, we can get a better idea 
about the future research hotspots and development of the IoT 
security. 
APPENDIX 
We publish all research and survey papers that we collected 
and studied on the GitHub as shown below. We will continue to 
update our research papers. 
https://github.com/chaojixx/IoT-security-papers 
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